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IN THE ~SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND LA V AR DENISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL 
OIL C01iP ANY, a corporHtion, and 
DORA HAR'TLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Civil 
No. 8554 
RESPONDENTS' ALVIN D. CHAPMAN AND 
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
We cannot aecept the st:atement of facts as set forth 
in the appellant's brief. While we recognize that in a 
case where a verdict has been directed in fHvor of the 
respondents, the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most f.a;vorable to 
the appellant, we believe that counsel for the appellant 
has overlooked the equally familiar principle that the 
testimony of a witness can be no stronger than it is left 
on cross-examination. In the instant suit, there is very 
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little conflict in the evidence. All of the witnesses were 
called by the pJaintiff, and there is no substantial dis-
pute in their testimony. The f·acts relevant to the issue's 
of this ap,pe,al may be briefly stated as follows: 
On the evening of the accident, the defendant Dora 
Hartley was enroute to a n1eeting in Orem (T. 63). She 
entered U.S. I-Iighway 91 from the east side thereof, at 
the point where it is intersected by what is known as the 
C'arterville Road (T. 63). Prior to entering the high-
way, Mrs. Hartley stopped in response to a stop sign, 
and observed for traffic approaching from the left or 
south (T. 64). She observed the Continental Oil truck 
approaching at a distance about two blocks away (T. 65). 
She entered the highway .and proceeded northerly along 
the extreme easterly edge of the highway (T. 66). She 
was not certain whether she was entirely in the right 
hand lane of the highway, or partially in the right hand 
lane and partially on the right shoulder (T. 68, 73, 74). 
The street "'\\ras covered with ice, and the lines marking 
the lanes of traffic were not vi~ible (T. 68). The rear 
wheels of her car 'vere equipped with Enow tires, and it 
was in good 1neehanical c.ondition (T. 66). She pro-
ceeded very slo,vly up the hill, at a rate of speed esti-
rnated by her at appToximately 15 n1iles per hour (T. 67). 
She had h:ad previous experience in driving this hill 
under wintry conditions; and she 'vas eognizant of the 
perils involved (T. 67). She had her car co1npletely 
under eontrol ( T. 68). .At about the tirne the oil truck 
reached her (in the left l1and lane for north bound 
traffic.), she suddenly (•'quirk as a flash") lost eontrol 
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of her car, and it spun in a counter-clockwise direction 
("spun sideways out into the lane of traffic") (T. 70, 71). 
It made only about a quarter of a turn when it eame 
forcibly into collision with something els.e, and then spun 
rlockwise, finally coming to rest on the right hand, or 
east shoulder of the highway, and facing in a southerly 
direction (T. 71). None of the foregoing testimony is 
disputed by any other 'vitness. 
The defendant Chap1nan, operator of the oil truck, 
testified that he had stopped for the semaphore light at 
the botton1 of the Orem hill (T. 90). When the light 
changed to green in his favor, he st~arted up the· hill in the 
extreme right hand lane. He observe·d the Hartley car in 
the lane ahead of him, (':r. 86), and as he appro:ached it, 
he swung out ]nto the center lane to pass (T. 91). She 
did not appear to he having any difficulty, nor did her 
ear appear to be out of control ( T. 87, 90). As he was 
about to pass her car, it suddenly went out of control, 
.and slipped or skidded into the pathway of his truck, 
coming into collision therewith, and causing him to lose 
control (T. 91, 93, 94). Notwithstanding Chapman's 
efforts to hold the truck on the right side of the road 
(T. 93), it slid diagonally across the highway, where it 
finally came to rest with the front end against the guard-
rail on the west side of the highway (T. 94). At about 
the time the truck came to re·st, it w.as struck by the 
plaintiff's automobile (T. 95). This testimony of Chap-
man is also undis.p·uted. 
The plaintiff testified that on the afternoon of the 
accident, he had been with his boys attending to their 
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horses in the northern part of Orem (T. 115). It had 
been snowing all afternoon ( T. 115). They were return-
ing to their home, but at about the top of the Orem Hill, 
the plaintiff ·decided to drive down the hill to the service 
S't.ation to fill his tank with gasoline (T. 118). On direct 
examination he testified that he was traveling at about 
35 miles per hour two blocks north of the top of the hill, 
err. 116), but that he slowed down, although to what 
extent he did not know, anticipating that he would turn 
off the highway toward his home (T. 117). After he 
started down the hill, he never again used the acceler:ator, 
( T. 117), and after testing his brakes and finding that 
they would not decelerate his car, he shifted down into 
second gear to further reduce his speed (T. 118). How-
ever, on cross-examination he admitted that according 
to his best judgn1ent he \vas traveling 35 miles per hour 
.at the top of the hill, ( T. 131), and at a point only 200 
feet north of the point of in1pact, he was traveling at 
30 miles per hour (T. 132). He 'Yas aware of the danger 
of an accident "Then the defendant's truck "~as 50 to 60 
feet aw.ay, (T. 1:22), but he 'Yas unable to stop in time 
to avoid a collision, and he struck the truck ''~th such 
force .and violence that his car bounc.ed back up the hill 
six to eight feet (T. 15, 1:28), and both vehicles we.re 
da1 HHgPd to the extent of $1200 ( T. 132). That he was 
going at a speed of 35 nriles per hour at the top of the 
hill 'vaH eorroborated by his son Douglas (T. 153). The 
plaintiff a.d1nitted that he had lived in Oren1 for 7 years~ 
that 1lP "'a8 thoroughly fanliliar \Yith the Ore1n Hill: 
that in pt'riods of adverse ':veather, the hill \Yas usually 
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more slipp·ery and difficult than t.he level road; and 
that he had reason to anticipate that the hill would be 
more slippery than the level ro.ad on the night of the 
accident (T. 128). 
Mrs. Hartley te~stified that after the accident, the 
plaintiff said that he was g·oing too fast for existing con-
ditions (T. 75, 76, 78, 80, 81). He did not deny making 
such an admission ( T. 127) . 
It is true that officers Levin and Loveless testified, 
over obje·ction, that in their opinion, the maximum safe 
speed on t·he Orem hill on the evening of the .. accident 
was 10 to 15 miles per hour, (Levin) (T. 19); or 20 miles 
per hour, (I~oveless) (T. 43). We believe that this was 
inadmissible opinion ev·idence, since it called for a con-
clusion on a subject on which laymen are capable of form-
ing valid opinions without the need for expert assistance. 
However, both witnesses admitted, on cross-examination, 
that they had had no experience in operating a transport 
tr~tck and trailer of the kind being operated by Chapman, 
and that their opinions were based purely upon their 
experience in operating ordinary passenger type ve-
hicles (T. 32, 45). They admitted that they were not 
qualified to give an opinion as to wh,a.t would he a safe 
speed for a truck and trailer having in mind the differ-
ence in weight, traction, controllability, etc. (T. 31, 32, 
45, 46). On the other hand, the witness Chapman who 
had had considerable experience in the management of 
such equipment, (T. 98, 99), testified that in his opinion, 
35 miles per hour w.as a safe speed for the truck and 
trailer on the evening of the accident, and a safeT speed 
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than a les-ser spee·d would have been (T. 105, 111, 112). 
He pointed out that at lesser speeds, there would be 
dangers of the equipment stalling on the highway, or 
"spinning out," which would imperil not only that equip-
ment, but also other traffic on the highway (T. 104, 105, 
108). The opinion of Ch;a.pman was the only opinion of a 
qualified witness as to the safe speed for the operation 
of a tank truck and trailer, and is not disputed or con-
troverted by any admissible evidence. 
We particularly wish to note our dissent to the state-
lnent on page 2 of the appellant's brief, that Denison 
/slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he approached 
\ 
the crest of the hill. 'V e have searched the reoord in vain 
for any testin1ony io support that statement. There is 
considerable evidence to the contrary, 'vhich oomes from 
the n1outh of the plaintiff himself, and his infant son. 
·we also disagree with the statement that Chapman was 
approxi1nately one foot v~~est of the dividing line between 
the two north traffic lanes. The only basis for such a 
~tate1nent is the opinion test.nnony of Officer Levin that 
the point of intpart "~as one foot 'vest of the dividing line 
(~~- :21). But C~hap1nan testified that he ,,~as "right 
against" or "over a little bit" fro1n the center line (T. 
91). The evidence sho"\Ys '" ithout dispute that :\Irs. Hart-
1(-l~~ \Vas at all tiines on the extre1ne right hand side of the 
road, and that Chapn1an "\vas in the proper lane to pass 
the IIartley auto1nobile. 
All of the "\vitnesses agreed that at the tune and place 
of the accident, the highway was eovered 'vith ice, and 
\vas extrem.ely slippery. 
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STATEl\fENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HAR.TLEY AUTO- ) 
MOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY ' 
WOULD BE JUSTI·FIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGEN·CE. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT CHAPM4N WAS NOT DRIVING AT I/'/ 
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT 
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE 
PART OF CHAPMAN. 
POIN1, III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO ~ 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS O·F THIS CASE. 
POINT IV. 
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUIUTY OF ANY NEGLI- v 




Plaintiff's argument appears to be predicated upon 
a false pre·mise. He apparently proceeds on the erron-
eous assumptions tha.t bec;ause the accident occurred on 
the plaintiff's own right hand side of the road, and that 
the defendant's oil truck was at the moment of imp1act 
on the wrong side of the road, that as a matter of law 
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the plaintiff was free of fault, and that one or more of 
the defendants must have been guilty of some actionable 
negligence. Neither of these assumptions is well founded. 
In at least four decisions of this court, a driver on 
the right side of the road has been held guilty of negli-
gence in failing to avoid collision with an automobile on 
the wrong side of the road. In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Ut. 
68, 94 Pac. ( 2d), 1068, this court affirmed a finding by 
the trial court that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence, in failing to turn out and avoid the autombile 
in which plaintiff was riding, and which was approaching 
12 to 15 inches across the center line and on the wrong 
side of the road. In Ercanbrack v. Ellison, 134 Pac. (2d) 
177, the plaintiff was held guilty of negligence, although 
entirely on his own right side of the road, in not slowing 
up or stopping to pern1it the defendant's truck to com-
plete the p·assing of another automobile proceeding to-
ward the plaintiff. In ThoH1as c. Sadleir, 162 Pac. (2d) 
112, the defendant \vas held liable to a. plaintiff who \Yas 
riding as a passenger in an auton1o bile traveling partly 
on the ,,·rong side of the road, sinee the defendant failed 
to travel in the extre1ne right hand lane, but "Tas traveling 
in the lane neare~t the eenter of the high"\\~ay. ..A_nd in 
florsley c. Robinsou, 11~ lTt. ~~7, 186 Pae. (:2d) 592, the 
defendant \Vas held liable to a pa~senger in its bus, for 
rn iln rP to avoid striking an auto1nobile \vhich skidded 
ont or eontrol on a slippery high\Y"ay, and passed in front 
of thP dPfendant's bus. Ineidentally~ in the case last 
e i.ted, the driver of the en r \Yhir h \Vent out of control, and 
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into the pathway of the bus, was exonerated from lia-
bility. 
'rhe cases above cited leave no room for doubt, that 
the 1nere fact that a person is upon his own right hand 
side of the highway, does not relieve him from ,all re-
sponsibility to be alert for traffic which may cross his 
path, and to avoid collision with such traffic when there 
is a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
Equally fallacious is plaintiff's contention, that be-
cause the truck of the defendant came· upon the plain-
tiff's side of the highway, it must have been negligently 
operated. The evidence not only shows without dispute, 
but the uniformity of the testimony emphasized, that the 
highway at the time and place of the accident was 
covered with ice, and was extremely slippery. It is well 
settled that the mere fact that ,an automobile skids or 
slides on a slippery highway, is not evidence, in and of 
itself, of negligence on the part of the opera1tor thereof. 
If the automobile was carefully operated, and was caused 
to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to the 
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the 
operator is not guilty of negligence, .and the accident is 
(leemed unavoidable. See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439, 
.. Automobiles and High,vay Traffic, Sections 193, and 341. 
The same rule has been recognized by this court. In West 
v. Standard Fuel Co., 17 Pac. (2d) 292, this court said at 
page 294: 
"There is no evidence tha.t plaintiff did not 
have his automobile under control unless it may 
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be said that the fact that his automobile skidded 
into the truck is such evidence. Such fact may 
not be said to show as a matt'er of law that plain-
tiff did not have control of his automobile." 
See also 3-4 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 
Section 68, P·age 120. The same rule is followed and 
numerous cases are cited in support thereof, in the anno-
tations in 58 A.L.R., at page 261, and 113 A.L.R-. 992, 
both relied upon by the plaintiff. 
So far as the defendants Chapman and Continental 
Oil Comp.any are concerned, there is no need for specu-
lation or conjecture, as to the cause of the oil truck skid-
ding out of control. The evidence is undisputed that the 
oil truck was proceeding northerly on its own side of the 
road, and in the proper lane for passing th~ Hartley 
auto1nobile. While thus lawfully proceeding along the 
highway, it was struck by the Hartley automobile, which 
had n1omentarily skidded out of the control of its opera-
tor, and collided forcibly ,,~ith the oil truck, thus forcing 
the oil truck out of the control of its driver, Chapman, 
and across the high,vay, and into the pathway of the 
plaintiff. TheTe is no dispute that the oil truck 'vas 
knocked out of control by the Hartley aut.on1obile, and 
not by any act on the p.art of its operator. 
As we understand the plaintiff's position, he relies 
for recovery against the defendants Chapn1an and Con-
tiHPntal Oil Con1pany on t"To grounds: First, that they 
atte1npted to pass the Hartle~~ automobile~ at a too close, 
or nns.afe distanee: and secondly, that the trurk "Tas 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
operated at an excessive rate of speed in view of the con-
ditions then and there existing. We consider these points 
8eriatim: 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTO-
MOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY 
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUII.ITY OF 
NEGLIGEN·CE. 
According to the testimony of Mrs. Hartley, she was 
proceeding along the extreme right hand edge of the 
highway. Her right whe:els nright have been off the hard 
surfaced portion of the road and on to the shoulder. 
Officer Levin testified that the lanes of traffic were about 
12 feet wide, and that the Hartley car was about six 
or seven feet wide. This would leave a dist1ance of at 
least five to six feet bet\veen the left side of the Hartley 
car and the line dividing the two north hound lane.s of 
traffic. Officer Levin also fixed the point of impact as 
one foot west of this dividing line. This would indieate 
a clearance distance of at least six to seven feet between 
the Hartley ear and the oil truck. 
The w:Utness Chapman testified th:at he was near the 
eenter line of the highway, or as he put it, "right against, 
or ... over a little bit" from the center line (1\ 91). 
He could not properly have proceeded further to the left 
\vithout endange~ring south bound traffic. He also testi-
fied that he had "over three feet" or "quite a bit further 
than that" of clearance of the Hartley ear ( T. 91). 
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It is difficult to conceive how the defendalllt Chap-
man could have allowed more passing distance. Mrs. 
Hartley was on the extreme right hand side of the road, 
and he was as near the center as he could properly drive. 
Clearly -the accident occurred, not by reason of any fault 
on the part of Chap1nan, in allowing insufficient clear-
ance of the Har~tley automobile, but by reason of the 
Hartley automobile suddenly going out of control and 
into the oil truck. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT 
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT 
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE 
PART OF CHAPMAN. 
The argument that the oil truck was proceeding at 
an unsafe speed is equally without merit. While the 
speed of the truck was established pr.actically without 
dispute at about 35 miles per hour at the moment of the 
accident, ~there is no competent evidence in the record 
that this was not a safe rate of spe·ed for the truck to 
travel; and there is the uncontradicted expert testimony 
of Chapn1an hilnself, that 35 nriles per hour ''as the 
minimun1 s.afe speed at ,,~hich the truck could negotiate 
the hill. 'rhe plaintiff relies upon the testhnony of the 
two poliee offieers, fixing the n1axin1m11 safe speed at 
1 G to ~0 1niles per hour. fio,Yever, as "~e pointed out in 
our statc1nent of faets, sueh opinions, even if ,adnrissible, 
\V<'rP hased purely· upon the officers' experience in oper-
ating ordinary passenger type rehicles. Both adn1itted, 
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that they had no kno,vledge or experience whatsoeve~r 
'vith truck and trailer equip·ment, .and admitted, that such 
equipment by reason of its much greater weight, larger 
number of \vheels and other differences, might be safely 
operated at a greater rate of speed under the conditions 
prevailing on the evening of the accident. Chapman, on 
the other hand, who qualified .as an expert in handling 
of large truck and trailer units, testified that the truck 
and trailer could not have been operated up the hill at a 
lesser speed than 35 miles per hour without dangeT of 
'"spinning out," which would endanger not only that 
equipment, but also all 01ther tr.affic on the highway. 
Even if a jury rnight find that 35 miles per hour 
\Vas an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances, 
the evidence is clear, and without dispute, that the colli-
sion was not caused by speed, but was caused solely by 
the I-Iartley automobile going out of control.and collid-
ing 'vi,th the oil truck. The same result would h·a:ve occur-
red, if the truck had heen going only 20 miles per hou.r. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE . 
.i\s a sort of last resort, the plaintiff suggests that 
he should be entitled to go to the jury under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. It requires no extended argument to 
demonstrate that the doctrine has no application to the 
facts of this case. It is well settled that in order for tha~t 
doctrine to apply, the instrumentality causing the dam-
age n1ust have been under the sole and exclusive control 
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of the defendant, and that the accident must have been 
of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur, ex-
cept as a result of negligent inspection, use or operation. 
Laos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Ut.), 108 Pac. (2d) 
254. Neither element is present in this case. The truck 
was not in the exclusive control of Chapman and the 
Continental Oil Company. On the contrary, it had been 
knocked comp~etely out of their control by the independ-
ent, intervening ·act of the defendant llartley. 
Nor ean skidding out of control be said to be such 
an event as will not ordinarily occur, except as a 
result of negligence on the part of the operator of the 
vehicle. On the contrary, courts have long and uni-
versally recognized that the most carefully operated ve-
hicle may slide from its operator's control on slick and 
slippery roads. 5A Am. Jur., 439, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic, Sec. 341 .. The case of Barret v. Caddo 
Transfer & Warehouse Conzpany, 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 
563, 58 ALR 261, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff, 
is ample authority on this point. The court there quoted 
with approval fron1 Linden v. Miller. 172 \\ ... is. 20, 177 
N.W. 909: 
"Skidding may occur \Yithout f.ault, and \Yhen 
it does occur it n1ay like,vise continue without 
fault for a considerable space and time. It 1neans 
partial or complete loss of control of the car 
under circnn1stances not necessar-ily inlplying 
negligence. l-Ienee Pl~aintiff 's elaiJ.n that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present 
situation is not well founded. In order to make 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be 
held that skidding itself in1plies negligence. This 
it doe~ not. It -is a 1Cell-knoU'II z1h.1JSical fact that 
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ca~rs may skid on greasy or slippery roads with-
out fault either on acco~tnt of the manner of han-
dling the car, or on account of its being there." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
As was picturesquely said in L'Ecuyer v. Farns-
lcorth, 106 Vt. 180, 170 A. 677: 
·"The sudden and unexpected skidding of an 
automobile is one of the natural hazards of driv-
ing cars on icy roads, and it may happen to the 
best of oper~ators; and the viatic vagaries of auto-
mobiles when skidding on icy roads are as well 
known to automobile drivers as thos:e of cows." 
Other cases to the same effect are found in the anno-
tation in 58 ALR, commencing at page 269, where it is 
said: 
"It has been generally held that the mere fact 
that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement 
does not of itself consti tut:e evidence of negligence 
upon the driver's part so as to render the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine applicable." 
J[ore recent decisions are collected in the annotation 
in 113 ALR, commencing at page 1014: 
Plaintiff relies upon the recent decision of an inter-
Inediate appellrute court of the state of California, Bar-
rera v. deLa1'orre, (Cal. App.), 300 Pac. (2d) 100. We 
question the reasoning of the decision, but right or 
\Vrong, there were two distinguishing fact elements pres-
ent in that ease not p~resent here. First, in that case, there 
1.vas dispute in the evidence as to whether there had been 
an antecedent collision between defendant's vehicle and 
a third vehicle which had caused the subsequent collision 
'vith plaintiff's building. This is of great importance 
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in determining whether defendant had exclusive control. 
In the case at bar, the evidence is undisputed, and was 
developed by the plaintiff himself, that the oil truck was 
knocked out of control by an antecedent collision with 
the Hartley automobile, .and wholly without f.ault on the 
p~arrt of the operator of the oil truck. Secondly, the Cali-
fornia ease did not involve icy slippery roads, such as 
were involved in the 0ase at bar. And as above noted, 
skidding out of control on icy roads, does not necessarily 
bespeak negligence. 
POINT I,T. 
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
In directing ,a verdict for the defendants, the trial 
court took the position that the evidence showed conclu-
sively that the accident \Yas an inevitable or unavoidable 
accident, not caused by· the fault of any party to this 
action. In other words, the trial court found all of the 
p~arties free of negligence. \\.,. e believ-e that tlris holding 
is not only supported, but con1pelled, by the evidence. 
However, \Ve further contend tl1at if the defendant~ \Yere 
negligent in any of the particulars clain1ed by the plain-
tiff, it 1nust neeessarily followr that tl1e plaintiff "~as guilty 
of contributor~? negligence, for the record sho,,~s "ithout 
di~putP, that his conduct \Yas of the sa1ne kind and 
nature as that of the defendants, and if "~11at the defend-
ants did could be said to be negligence, it 1nust follow· 
that \r·hat. the plaintiff did \\~as like,,~ise negligence. If it 
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\Vas negligent for this defendant to travel 35 miles per 
hour up the hill, it was most certainly negligent for the 
plaintiff to tr.avel 30 miles per hour down the hill. The 
plaintiff by his own admission had reason to suspect that 
the hill would be more icy than the level road, and a car 
going down hill is accelerated by gravity, whe~reas a car 
going up hill h.as the aid of gravity in stop~ping in the 
event of an einergency. Although the plaintiff claims to 
have reduced speed between the time he started down 
the hill, and the moment of inlp,act, the evidence in this 
regard is very vague. However, the evidence is cle,ar that 
he appreciated the danger of an accident 50 or 60 feet 
before the impact occurred, .and that he was neither able 
to stop his automobile within that distance, nor was he 
able to reduce its speed appreciably. He struck the truck 
with such :force and violence, that both vehicles. were 
I 
rla1naged ~to the extent of $1200, and his own car bounced 
back up the hill six or eight feet. This was not a light 
blow. 
On p.age 13 of his brief, plaintiff suggests that the 
,jury had the right to find that JYirs. Hartley was negli-
gent for even trying to negotiate the hill at the time of 
the accident. If this be so, the jury must also necessarily 
find that Denison was equally negligent in attempting to 
do the sa1ne thing. Contrary to another statement on 
p.age 13 of plaintiff's brief, Mrs. Hartley tes,tified without 
contradiction or dispute, that she had experienced no 
difficulty negotiating the hill until the moment when 
she suddenly lost control of her car. Denison, on the 
other hand, admjttedly had difficulty all the way down. 
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He first atte1npted to apply brakes, and found that had 
no effect whatsoever. He then shifted into seeond gear, 
and finally as a last resort cut off the ignition. All of 
this faile~d to avoid the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Like counsel for the plaintiff, we have been unable 
to locate :any cases so closely similar in point of fact, 
.as might be said to be controlling or determinative of the 
case at bar. However, the general principles governing 
this cas~e, are well settled. There is no evidence from 
which a jury might properly find that the defendants 
Chapman and Continental Oil Company failed to allow 
sufficient cle~arance in p.assing the Hartley ear, nor is 
there evidenee to show ·excessive speed on the part of 
these defendants, or that speed on the part of these de-
fendants caused or contributed to cause the accident. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application to 
the facts of this case. The plaintiff "\Yas guilty of the 
s.ame kind of conduct of which he complains on the part 
of the defendants. Either the accident was an unavoid-
able accident, not eause·d by the negligence of any party, 
as held by the trial court, or else the plaintiff 'Yas guilty 
of eontributory negligence, and as such, "\Yas equally 
.culpable for his O"\vn loss, .and therefore, not entitled to 
recover. In either event, the judgment of the trial court 
is correct, and should be affirn1ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & ~CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for defendants and respondents 
Continental Oil Company and Chapman 
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